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Jurisdictional arrangements and international criminal procedure  
Sarah M.H. Nouwen and Dustin A. Lewis 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A homicide that amounts to a war crime, crime against humanity or genocide—the crimes 
most commonly within the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals—is at the same time 
a  crime  under  most  national  laws,  as  the  ‘ordinary  crime’
1  of  homicide  or  as  a  crime 
corresponding with the international definition, and thus also falls within the jurisdiction of 
one or several states. The same applies to many of the other actūs rei of the international 
crimes in the statutes of international criminal  tribunals, for instance rape or torture. The 
creation of international criminal tribunals has thus led to more overlap in jurisdictions. This 
overlap  serves  the  dominant  aim  of  international  criminal  justice:  the  more  courts  with 
jurisdiction over an international crime, the more opportunities for combating impunity. But 
the overlap may also result in one specific case being pursued in several jurisdictions: in 
several national jurisdictions, in several international jurisdictions or, the focus of this chapter, 
in an international and a national jurisdiction. Judicial economy, the interests of the accused, 
the principle of state sovereignty and the factor of international concern require that such a 
conflict of jurisdictions is resolved. Jurisdictional arrangements are the rules and practices that 
have developed to regulate conflicts potentially emerging from overlapping international and 
national jurisdictions.  
Jurisdictional  arrangements  are  inextricably  related  to  rules  of  criminal  procedure. 
First, the arrangement itself is a procedure for managing competing claims to jurisdiction. 
Secondly, by providing circumstances in which the international tribunal may compel a state 
to  defer  to  its  jurisdiction,
2  may  exercise its jurisdiction
3  and  may  refer proceedings to 
                                                 
1 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session: Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994), 58 
describes a trial of an ‘ordinary crime’ as one in which the act is tried as a common crime 
under domestic law instead of an international crime with the special characteristics of the 
international crimes as defined in the Statute.  
2 Article 9(2) ICTY Statute and Rule 9  ICTY RPE; Article 8(2) ICTR Statute and Rule  9 
ICTR RPE; Article 8(2) SCSL Statute and Rule 9 SCSL RPE; Article 4(2) and (3)(b)–(c) STL 
Statute and Rule 17 STL RPE. 
3 Article 17 ICC Statute. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957578
Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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national  jurisdictions
4  that depend on particular features of the domestic justice system, 
jurisdictional arrangements can serve as a conduit for channelling rules of criminal procedure 
to national jurisdictions. International tribunals may thereby, in addition to functioning as a 
model, act as an instrument to influence domestic criminal procedure. Finally, rules of priority 
are invoked, applied and decided upon in accordance with specific rules of procedure.  
This  chapter  elaborates  the  first  topic,  the  procedure  that  is  the  jurisdictional 
arrangement, focusing on those elements of the jurisdictional arrangement that could weaken 
or strengthen the arrangement’s conduit potential. On the basis of this analysis the conclusion 
suggests some hypotheses on the potential of various jurisdictional arrangements to serve as a 
mechanism to influence domestic criminal procedure.  
B. THE PROCEDURE THAT IS THE JURISDICTIONAL ARRANGEMENT 
Attempting to capture the jurisdictional arrangements of the various international criminal 
tribunals in simple terms, the field of international criminal law has come up with the labels 
‘exclusive’, ‘concurrent’, ‘primary’ and ‘complementary’ jurisdiction. ‘Exclusive’ refers to an 
international  criminal  tribunal’s  depriving  national  courts  of  jurisdiction  over  the  same 
crimes—a jurisdictional arrangement that in fact none of the international criminal tribunals 
to date has had. ‘Concurrent’ means that national courts keep their jurisdiction over the crimes 
which are within the international tribunal’s jurisdiction—the dominant practice. Concurrency 
in  jurisdiction  requires  rules  of  priority  in  the  specific  case.  An  international  court’s 
jurisdiction is ‘primary’ when, in a specific case, it takes precedence over the jurisdiction of 
national courts, and ‘complementary’ when it may exercise its jurisdiction only in the absence 
of (genuine) national proceedings.  
It  is,  however,  important  to  note  that  there  is  no  ‘exclusive’  or  ‘concurrent’ 
jurisdiction, or ‘primacy’ or ‘complementarity’ of jurisdiction in the abstract; the labels have 
been  put  on  specific  arrangements  in  specific  statutes  that  provide  for  the  specific 
circumstances in which an international criminal tribunal may or may not exercise jurisdiction 
when a national court has jurisdiction over the same crimes. The specific arrangements, rather 
than  the  labels  put  on  them,  should  therefore  be  the  starting  point  of  the  analysis.  Such 
analysis  reveals  that  most  arrangements  do  not  amount  to  full  primacy  or  full 
complementarity, but are somewhere in between, rendering the tribunal’s jurisdiction more or 
less primary and more or less complementary. 
                                                 
4 Rule 11 bis ICTY RPE; Rule 11 bis ICTR RPE; Rule 11 bis SCSL RPE; Articles 18 and 
19(11) ICC Statute. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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i. IMT and IMTFE 
Neither the Constitution of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) nor the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East  (IMTFE) contained explicit provisions on 
what is nowadays termed exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction or on the respective tribunal’s 
jurisdiction being primary or complementary. However, when using today’s terminology for 
the arrangement at the time, one can qualify the arrangements of both tribunals as one of 
concurrent jurisdiction with, at least in practice, primacy for the international tribunals.  
The jurisdiction of the IMT was concurrent with that of national courts. The 1943 
Moscow Declaration had provided that ‘those German officers and men and members of the 
Nazi  party who have been responsible for, or  have taken a  consenting part in  the  above 
atrocities,  massacres  and  executions,  will  be  sent  back  to  the  countries  in  which  their 
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the 
laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein.’
5 
The declaration was expressly ‘without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose 
offences  have  no  particular  geographical  localization  and  who  will  be  punished  by  joint 
decision of the Governments of the Allies’.
6 The latter took this decision in the 1945 London 
Agreement,  establishing  ‘an  International  Military  Tribunal  for  the  trial  of  war  criminals 
whose offenses have no particular geographical location’.
7 Since crimes without ‘particular 
geographical localization’ usually fall within several national jurisdictions, the jurisdiction of 
the IMT overlapped with that of national courts. The IMT’s Constitution did not establish 
exclusive jurisdiction for the tribunal. On the contrary, it explicitly provided that ‘[n]othing in 
this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of any national or occupation 
court established or to be established in any allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war 
criminals.’
8  
                                                 
5 [Moscow] Declaration of German Atrocities (released to the press Nov. 1, 1943) (‘Moscow 
Declaration’), 9 Department of State Bulletin (1943), p. 311.  
6 Moscow Declaration, supra note 5, p. 311.  
7 Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of major war criminals of the European Axis 
(‘London Agreement’), signed 8 August 1945, Article 1, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 281 (1951). 
8 London Agreement, supra note 7, Article 6. Article III(2) of the Control Council Law No. 
10 in turn provided: ‘Nothing herein is intended to, or shall impair or limit the Jurisdiction or 
power of any court or tribunal now or hereafter established in any Zone by the Commander 
thereof, or of the International Military Tribunal established by the London Agreement of 8 
August 1945’. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, 
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the 
Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946, pp. 50–55. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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The  IMTFE’s  jurisdiction,  too,  was  concurrent  with  that  of  national  courts.  The 
Special Proclamation establishing the IMTFE expressly stated that ‘[n]othing in this Order 
shall  prejudice  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other  international,  national  or  occupation  court, 
commission or other tribunal established or to be established in Japan or in any territory of a 
United Nation with which Japan has been at war, for the trial of war criminals.’
9 
While the IMT’s and IMTFE’s respective jurisdictions were concurrent with that of 
national courts, neither of the tribunals’ constitutive instruments provided a rule of priority in 
the event that both the international and a domestic court exercised jurisdiction over the same 
person. However, the London Agreement implied primacy of the IMT by reiterating in a 
preambular recital the paragraph in the Moscow Declaration according to which certain major 
war criminals would be punished ‘by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies’.
10 
Those states that signed up to the London Agreement thereby implicitly accepted the IMT’s 
primacy. 
  In  practice,  the  problem  of  competing  claims  to  jurisdiction  seems  to  have  arisen 
neither with respect to the IMT nor the IMTFE: the international tribunals focused on a few 
dozen  accused,  while  national  and  occupation  courts  as  well  as  military  commissions  in 
Europe, the United States and Asia handled thousands of others.
11  
Neither the IMT nor the IMTFE had provisions on whether the international tribunals 
could try a person after the person had been tried domestically . With respect to the reverse 
order, the IMT’s Charter explicitly authorized the national authorities of signatories to the 
London Agreement to prosecute defendants convicted by the International Tribunal.
12  
 
ii. ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL 
a. Concurrent jurisdiction 
The  Statutes  of  the  ICTY  and  ICTR  explicitly  provide  that  their  respective  tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of national courts.
13 So do the Statutes of the SCSL and 
                                                 
9 Special Proclamation–Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
19 January 1946, Article 3, reprinted in N. Boister and R. Cryer (eds), Documents on the 
Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008), p. 6.  
10 London Agreement, supra note 7, preamble, and Moscow Declaration, supra note 5, p. 311.  
11  Mark  Drumbl,  Atrocity,  Punishment,  and  International  Law  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 48–49, 50. 
12 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 11, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 290 (1951), 
with an exception for the crime of membership of a criminal organisation.  
13 Article 9(1) ICTY Statute; Article 8(1) ICTR Statute. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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STL, with the difference that the respective provisions are limited to concurrence with the 
jurisdiction  of  the  national  courts  of,  respectively,  Sierra  Leone  and  Lebanon.
14  In other 
words, the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL do not deprive national jurisdictions 
of jurisdiction over offences also within the international tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
 
b. Primacy 
The Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL also explicitly establish the primacy of the 
international  tribunal.
15  In  its  first  case,  the  ICTY  confirmed  the  Tribunal’s  primacy. 
Rejecting the defence’s argument that the Tribunal’s primacy violated state sovereignty and 
the defendant’s rights, it added:  
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it must be endowed with 
primacy over national courts. Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a perennial 
danger of international crimes being characterised as "ordinary crimes" (Statute of the International 
Tribunal, art. 10, para. 2(a)), or proceedings being "designed to shield the accused", or cases not being 
diligently prosecuted (Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 10, para. 2(b)). 
If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any one of those stratagems might be 
used to defeat the very purpose of the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of 
the very people whom it has been designed to prosecute.
16 
The Statutes differ, however, in the universality of their primacy. Whereas the ICTR’s Statute 
provides that the tribunal has primacy ‘over the national courts of all [s]tates’,
17 the ICTY’s 
Statute is not explicit as to whether the Tribunal’s primacy relates only to the state in which 
the crimes were committed or to all states in the world, or at least all UN Member States. The 
ICTY’s first case demonstrated that in the Court’s view it had primacy of jurisdiction vis-à-
vis all UN Member States.
18 The ad hoc tribunals could enjoy this primacy with respect to all 
UN Member States because the primacy was provided by Statutes that had been decided upon 
by the Security Council.
19 Member States must comply with Security Council decisions.
20  
                                                 
14 Article 8(1) SCSL Statute; Article 4(1) STL Statute. 
15 Article 9(2) ICTY Statute; Article 8(2) ICTR Statute; Article 8(2) SCSL Statute; Article 
4(1) STL Statute. 
16 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal,  Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-
AR72, A. Ch., ICTY, 2 October 1995 (‘Tadić Interlocutory Appeal’), para. 58. 
17 Article 8(2) ICTR Statute. 
18 Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 16, paras 56–60.  
19 For the ICTY Statute, see  Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security  Council  Resolution  808  (1993),  UN  Doc.  S/25704,  3  May  1993.  For  the  ICTR Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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The SCSL and STL also enjoy primacy, yet with respect only to the states in which the 
crimes were committed, namely, Sierra Leone and Lebanon.
21 The SCSL was established by 
an agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone and could therefore not bind third states. The 
parties to that agreement could thus not establish primacy for the SCSL with respect to states 
other than Sierra Leone. The SCSL Statute does not establish a hierarchy for the event of 
competing claims to jurisdiction between a non-Sierra Leonean national court and the SCSL. 
The STL is based on a similar agreement between a state and the UN  and therefore cannot 
bind third states.
22 
 
c. Conditional primacy 
While the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL all explicitly state that the  tribunals 
have primacy, this primacy is in fact conditional: only in the circumstances provided by their 
Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence may the Tribunals ask a state to defer a case to 
it.
23  
In the case of the ICTY, ‘the Prosecutor may propose to the Trial Chamber ... that a 
formal request be made that [a court in a state] defer to the competence of the Tribunal’ only  
[w]here it appears to the Prosecutor that in any such investigations or criminal proceedings instituted in 
the courts of any State: 
(i) the act being investigated or which is the subject of those proceedings is characterized as an ordinary 
crime; 
 (ii) there is a lack of impartiality or independence, or the investigations or proceedings are designed to 
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently prosecuted; or 
(iii) what is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions 
which may have implications for investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal
24. 
                                                                                                                                                         
Statute, see UNSC Res. 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994 and 
Annex thereto. 
20 UN Charter, Article 25. See also Article 103.  
21 Article 8(2) SCSL Statute; Article 4(1) STL Statute. 
22 The Security Council could have established the STL’s primacy with respect to all UN 
Member States in the resolution by which it brought the agreement between the UN and 
Lebanon into force, but has not done so. Third states requested by the STL pursuant to rule 19 
of its RPE to defer a case to its jurisdiction are therefore under no obligation to do so. 
23 See also Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 16, para. 59 (noting that ‘The principle of 
primacy of this International Tribunal over national courts must be affirmed; the more so 
since it is confined within the strict limits of Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute and Rules 9 and 
10 of the Rules of Procedure of the International Tribunal.’). 
24 Rule 9 ICTY RPE. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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In practice, the ICTY Trial Chamber has based its requests for deferral on the third ground.
25 
Politically this is the least sensitive ground as it is based on the interests of the tribunal rather 
than on an assessment of domestic proceedings. 
The ICTR initially had the same grounds as the ICTY on which to base a request for a 
deferral
26  and in its practice, too, all deferral requests were based on the third ground.
27 
However, the RPE were amended to the effect that whether the Tribunal may  request a 
deferral is even more a matter to the discretion of the Tribunal.
28 According to the amended 
RPE the Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber to issue a formal request for a deferral:  
Where it appears to the Prosecutor that crimes which are the subject of investigations or criminal 
proceedings instituted in the courts of any State:  
(i) Are the subject of an investigation by the Prosecutor;  
(ii) Should be the subject of an investigation by the Prosecutor considering, inter alia:  
                                                 
25 In Mrkšić the Prosecutor also argued the request for the deferral on ground of rule 9(ii) (a 
lack of impartiality or independence), but the Trial Chamber made the request on grounds of 
rule 9(iii) alone. Decision on the Proposal of the Prosecutor for a Request to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to Defer the Pending Investigations and 
Criminal Proceedings to the Tribunal, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Šlijvančanin and Radić, IT-95-
13-R61, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 10 December 1998, paras 4–5.  
The ground of rule 9(iii) was tested in the Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 16. The 
Appeals Chamber refused to review the Trial Chamber’s application of rule 9(iii), affording 
the Chamber a wide margin of appreciation. Ibid., para. 52.  
26 Rule 9 ICTR RPE (as originally adopted on 5 July 1995 and up until the amendment of 
Rule 9 ICTR RPE adopted on 6 June 1997). 
27 Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request 
for Deferral to the Competence of the Internat ional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the 
Matter of Alfred Musema (Pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence), Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-5-D, T. Ch. I, ICTR, 12 March 1996 (‘Musema 
Deferral’); Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal 
Request for Deferral to the Competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
the Matter of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines sarl (Pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 of 
the  Rules  of  Procedure  and  Evidence),  Prosecutor  v.  Radio  Television  Libre  des  Mille 
Collines  sarl,  ICTR-96-6-D,  T.  Ch.  I,  ICTR,  12  March  1996  (‘Mille  collines  Deferral’); 
Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for 
Deferral to the Competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter 
of Théoneste Bagosora (Pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence); 
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-96-7-D, T. Ch. I, ICTR, 17 May 1996 (‘Bagosora Deferral’) 
(all when ICTR still had same Rule 9(iii) as ICTY). Arguments for the criteria of Rule 9(iii) 
being fulfilled were that the competent national courts could prosecute only for war crimes 
(neither Swiss nor Belgian criminal legislation at the time contained provisions on crimes 
against  humanity  or  genocide),  avoiding  the  repetition  of  testimony,  the  engendering  of 
distrust of the witnesses, the potential traumatisation of the witnesses, and the threat of bodily 
harm to witnesses. Musema Deferral, paras 12 and 13; Mille collines Deferral, paras 11 and 
12; Bagosora Deferral, paras 12 and 13. 
28 Rule 9 ICTR RPE (as amended on 6 June 1997, ICTR Fourth Plenary Session). Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
9 
 
(a) The seriousness of the offences;  
(b) The status of the accused at the time of the alleged offences;  
(c) The general importance of the legal questions involved in the case;  
(iii) Are the subject of an indictment in the Tribunal.
29  
The SCSL has nearly identical grounds on which to request a deferral as the ICTR.
30 The STL 
has the most unconditional primacy of all international criminal tribunals, probably because it 
has subject-matter jurisdiction over only one particular attack (and potentially over attacks of 
a similar character that are related to that one attack).
31 The Statute provides explicitly that the 
Lebanese authorities must defer to the STL’s jurisdiction in the particular case and in the 
potential related cases.
32  
In  practice,  the  ICTY,  ICTR,  SCSL  and  STL  have  never  declined  a  Prosecutor’s 
request for a deferral to those respective tribunals in a specific case.
33 
 
d. Non bis in idem 
The ICTY’s and ICTR’s Statutes provide that a person may not be subsequently tried by 
national courts for acts constituting crimes under the statute of the international tribunal for 
which  the  person  has  already  been  tried  by  the  respective  International  Tribunal.
34  As 
agreements not binding states other than Sierra Leone or  Lebanon, the Statutes of the SCSL 
and STL prohibit only, respectively, Sierra Leonean and Lebanese courts from trying a person 
for acts for which he or she has already been tried by the international court.
35  Since 
international  law  does  not  prohibit  retria l  in  a  different  jurisdiction,  states  other  than, 
respectively, Sierra Leone and Lebanon are thus free to try a person already tried by the 
international tribunals.  
                                                 
29 Rule 9 ICTR RPE (as amended on 6 June 1997, ICTR Fourth Plenary Session). 
30 Rule 9 SCSL RPE. 
31 Article 1 STL Statute.  
32 Article 4(2) and (3) STL Statute . See also Rule 17(E) STL RPE.  Since the RPE cannot 
grant powers beyond those of the Statute, the Rule must be interpreted to apply only to the 
cases referred to in Article 4(3) STL Statute, namely attacks related to the attack wi thin the 
Court’s jurisdiction. 
33 In one ‘rather unusual scenario of concurrent jurisdiction’, the ICTY Trial Chamber did 
refuse in part an application in which the Prosecutor sought, among other things, a request 
from the Tribunal that the competent authorities in Macedonia generally defer ‘current and 
future investigations and prosecutions’. Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a Deferral 
and Motion for Order to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, In re The Republic of 
Macedonia, Case No. IT-02-55-MISC.6, T. Ch. I, ICTY, 4 October 2002, paras 39, 45–53. 
34 Article 10(1) ICTY Statute; Article 9(1) ICTR Statute.  
35 Article 9(1) SCSL Statute; Article 5(1) STL Statute. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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Whereas the ‘downward’ non bis in idem prohibition is absolute, the non bis in idem 
prohibition has exceptions in the scenario that the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL or STL undertake to try 
a person who has already been tried by a national court. The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL are 
allowed to do so in two situations:  where (1) the act for which he or she was tried  was 
characterized as an ‘ordinary crime’; or (2) the national court proceedings were not impartial 
or  independent,  the  proceedings  were  designed  to  shield  the  accused  from  international 
criminal responsibility or the case was not diligently prosecuted.
36 The STL is allowed to retry 
only in the latter situation.
37 
 
e. Referrals 
Obliged by the Security Council to develop a ‘completion strategy’, the judges in the ICTY 
and ICTR inserted into their RPEs a procedure to refer cases to national jurisdictions. This 
rule 11 bis has been revised multiple times, but in essence it entails that a ‘Referral Bench’ (in 
the ICTY) or a Trial Chamber (in the ICTR) may determine, proprio motu or at the request of 
the  Prosecutor,  that  a  case  involving  a  confirmed  indictment
38  should be referred to the 
authorities of a state: 
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or 
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or 
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case, so that those 
authorities should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate court for trial within that State.
39 
While the STL does not have a procedure to refer cases to national courts, the SCSL can refer 
cases to national jurisdictions on a ground that is identical to ground (iii) of the ICTY’s and 
ICTR’s referral procedure.
40  
The ICTY’s,  ICTR’s  and  SCSL’s  referral  bodies  must  satisfy  themselves  that  the 
accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty, or, for the SCSL referral body, the 
                                                 
36  Article 10(2)(a)-(b) ICTY Statute; Article 9(2)(a) -(b) ICTR Statute; Article 9(2)(a) -(b) 
SCSL Statute. See also Rule 13 ICTY RPE; Rule 13 ICTR RPE. For the SCSL this provision 
applies only to the international crimes, and not to the Sierra Leonean crimes,  within its 
jurisdiction. Article 9(2) SCSL Statute.  A contrario it can be argued that the SCSL may not 
retry a person tried for crimes under Sierra Leonean law.  
37 Article 5(2) STL Statute. See also Rule 23 STL RPE. The ‘ordinary crimes’ exception is 
irrelevant in the context of the STL since the jurisdiction of the STL covers only crimes under 
Lebanese law.  
38 Regardless of whether the accused is in the Tribunal’s custody. 
39 Rule 11 bis (A)(i)-(iii) ICTR RPE; Rule 11 bis (A)(i)-(iii) ICTY RPE. 
40 Rule 11 bis (A) SCSL RPE. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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term of life imprisonment, shall not be imposed or carried out.
41 The ICTY’s Referral Bench 
should also consider ‘the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the 
accused’: if the alleged crimes are sufficiently grave and the accused is characterized as one 
of the ‘most senior leaders’, the accused will not be referred to national jurisdictions.
42 The 
ICTY’s and ICTR’s prosecutors may send observers to monitor the domestic proceedings, 
and, if the accused has not yet been acquitted or found guilty, request the respective tribunal 
to revoke the order referring the case to the domestic proceedings.
43 While neither Tribunals’ 
RPE explicitly indicate the grounds on which the prosecutor may request revocation of an 
order referring the accused to domestic proceedings, it logically follows that the grounds for 
revoking a referral order would be the same grounds on which a decision to refer is made.
44 
 
iii. ICC 
a. Concurrent jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the ICC, too, is concurrent with that of national courts, yet in important 
ways the ICC’s jurisdictional arrangements are distinct from those of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL 
and STL. 
 
b. Jurisdictional Hierarchy 
Instead of the respective forms of primacy of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL, the ICC has 
complementary jurisdiction. This means that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction in a case 
                                                 
41 Rule 11 bis (C) ICTR RPE; Rule 11 bis (B) ICTY RPE; Rule 11 bis (B) SCSL RPE. 
42 Rule 11 bis (C) ICTY RPE (footnotes omitted). This focus was imposed by the Security 
Council in Resolution 1534 (2004) in which it called on the ICTY’s and ICTR’s respective 
referral bodies when reviewing new indictments to ensure that only ‘the most senior leaders 
suspected  of  being  most  responsible  for  crimes  within  the  [Tribunals’]  jurisdiction’  stay 
within the Tribunals’ dockets. UNSC Res. 1534 (2004), UN Doc. S/RES/1534 (2004), 26 
March 2004, para. 5. This criterion for referral has resulted in the ironic situation that those 
accused who prefer trial in the ICTY to domestic prosecution argue that the crimes of which 
they have been accused are grave and their alleged level of responsibility arises to that of the 
‘most  senior  leaders’.  See,  e.g.,  Decision  on  Milan  Lukić’s  Appeal  Regarding  Referral, 
Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-AR11bis.1, A. Ch., ICTY, 11 July 2007, 
paras 23–26.  
43 Rule 11 bis (D)(iv) and (F) ICTR RPE; Rule 11 bis (D)(iv) and (F) ICTY RPE. 
44 The ICTY has not revoked any referral orders, though it has denied a revocation request 
from a defendant tried, convicted and sentenced in a national jurisdiction after referral by the 
International Tribunal. Decision on Gojko Janković’s Motion of 12 April 2010, Prosecutor v. 
Janković,  IT-96-23/2-PT,  Ref.  Bench,  ICTY,  21  June  2010.  The  ICTR  has  revoked  one 
referral order. Decision on Prosecution’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Revocation of the 
Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursuant to Rule 11bis (F) & (G), Prosecutor v. 
Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, T. Ch., ICTR, 17 August 2007. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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only if the case is not being, or has not been, genuinely investigated or prosecuted by any 
state. 
The ICC, unlike the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL, cannot request a state to ‘defer’ its 
proceedings  to  it.  Instead,  the  jurisdictional  hierarchy  is  given  effect  through  a  statutory 
provision on admissibility of cases before the ICC. Article 17(1) of the ICC Statute provides: 
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is 
inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not 
to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a 
trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
[45] 
(d) ….
[46] 
Article 17(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute envisage two basic scenarios in which cases 
are  admissible  before  the  ICC:  first,  where  no  relevant  domestic  proceedings  have  been 
initiated,  and  secondly,  where  domestic  proceedings  have  been  initiated  but  the  state  is 
unwilling  or  unable  to  conduct  these  proceedings  genuinely.  If  no  relevant  domestic 
proceedings  have been initiated, cases  are admissible before the  ICC because there is  no 
‘case’ that ‘is being investigated or prosecuted’, ‘has been investigated’ or ‘has already been 
tried’. In the absence of domestic proceedings there is thus no need for any determination of a 
state’s unwillingness or inability as defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 17.
47 In its first 
case-law the Court has interpreted terms in these provisions in such a way that the criteria for 
inadmissibility will not easily be fulfilled. For instance, the Appeals Chamber in Katanga and 
                                                 
45 The drafting is poor in that the condition in this article is that a trial is ‘not permitted’ under 
Article 20(3) of the ICC Statute, whereas Article 20(3) of the ICC Statute as a whole contains 
a prohibition. 
46 Article 17(1)(d) of the ICC Statute provides as a fourth ground of inadmissibility that ‘[t]he 
case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’, yet this is not  an 
element of complementarity and is therefore not reproduced here.  
47 See also Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, 
Prosecutor  v.  Lubanga,  Situation  in  the  DRC,  ICC-01/04-01/06-8,  P.  T.  Ch.  I,  ICC,  10 
February  2006  (‘Lubanga  Arrest  Warrant’),  para.  40;  Judgment  on  the  Appeal  of  Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of  12 June 2009 on the 
Admissibility of the Case, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in the DRC, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, A. Ch., ICC, 25 September 2009 (‘Katanga Admissibility Appeal’), 
para. 78; Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, 
P. T. Ch. II, ICC, 31 March 2010, paras 53–54. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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Bemba found a case admissible where domestic investigations were once initiated, but closed 
in view of the suspect’s transfer to the ICC, arguing that this presented neither a situation of 
ongoing proceedings for the purposes of Article 17(1)(a) nor a decision ‘not to prosecute’ for 
the purposes of Article 17(1)(b).
48 Moreover, the Court has narrowly construed the definition 
of a ‘case’, requiring for the same ‘case’ that the domestic proceedings encompass the same 
person, substantially the same conduct, the same incidents and (perhaps) the same head of 
criminal responsibility that form the subject of the ICC’s prosecution.
49 The consequence of 
this narrow approach to the notion of a ‘case’ is that national prosecutors will not avoid ICC 
intervention on grounds of complementarity in a given instance unless they select not only the 
same  person,  but  also  the  same  conduct,  incidents  and  perhaps  even  head  of  criminal 
responsibility that eventually form the subject of prosecution before the ICC. Even if national 
investigations or prosecutions were to encompass more serious acts allegedly committed by 
the accused, the case would be admissible before the ICC as long as the national proceedings 
did not encompass the very same conduct and incidents as those before the Court.
50 
Where  a  state  has  initiated  relevant  proceedings  in  the  same  case,  the  case  is 
nonetheless admissible before the ICC if the state ‘is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out  the  investigation  or  prosecution’  or  its  decision  not  to  prosecute  ‘resulted  from  the 
unwillingness or inability of the [s]tate genuinely to prosecute’.
51 The emphasis of the test is 
not on being ‘able and willing’—the state would seem to be so, given that proceedings are 
actually taking place or have taken place—but on the more normative requirement that the 
                                                 
48 Katanga Admissibility Appeal, supra note 47, paras 80, 82–83; Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 
entitled  ‘Decision  on  the  Admissibility  and  Abuse  of  Process  Challenges’,  Prosecutor  v. 
Bemba Gombo, Situation in the CAR, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08OA3, A.C., ICC, 19 October 
2010, paras 74–75. 
49 Lubanga Arrest Warrant, supra note 47, paras 31, 39–41; Decision on the Prosecution 
Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Harun and Kushayb, Situation in 
Darfur, the Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07-1, P. T. Ch. I, ICC, 27 April 2007, para. 24; 
Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of  30  May  2011  entitled  “Decision  on  the  Application  by  the  Government  of  Kenya 
Challenging  the  Admissibility  of  the  Case  Pursuant  to  Article  19(2)(b)  of  the  Statute”, 
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, Situation in Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 O, A. 
Ch., ICC, 30 August 2011, paras 39–41. 
50 See also Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain 
Katanga, pursuant to Article 19(2)(a), Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in 
the DRC, ICC-01/04-01/07-949, Defence, ICC, 11 March 2009, para. 42.  
51 Article 17(1)(a) and (b) ICC Statute.  Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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proceedings  be  conducted  ‘genuinely’.
52  To  date,  there  has  been  scant  case-law  on 
unwillingness and inability in Article 17,
53 so the following analysis is based on the text only.  
Unwillingness is defined in Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute:  
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, 
as applicable:  
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court referred to in article 5; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or 
are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice. 
The three listed indicators of unwillingness confirm, implicitly in the first circumstance and 
explicitly  in  the  second  and  third  circumstances,  that  what  is  at  issue  is  whether  the 
proceedings manifest a lack of intent to bring the person concerned to justice, that is to say to 
conduct genuine proceedings.
54 
Article 17(3)  of the ICC Statute  provides criteria for the determination of inability 
genuinely to conduct proceedings: 
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 
Accordingly, the Court shall consider both the causes and the consequences of inability to 
investigate or prosecute. Were total or substantial collapse of the national judicial system the 
                                                 
52  In  this  light,  the  attenuated  references  in  Articles  17(2)  and  (3),  respectively,  to 
‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ should be taken as shorthand for ‘unwillingness genuinely to 
investigate  or  prosecute’  and  ‘inability  genuinely  to  investigate  or  prosecute’.  See  more 
elaborately, S.M.H. Nouwen ‘Fine-tuning Complementarity’, in  B. Brown (ed.),  Research 
Handbook on International Criminal Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 206, 216–217.  
53 Chambers have addressed these elements in obiter dicta, e.g., Decision on the Admissibility 
and Abuse of Process Challenges, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Situation in the CAR, ICC-
01/05-01/08, T. Ch. III, ICC, 24 June 2010, paras 243–247; Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 entitled 
‘Decision  on  the  Admissibility  and  Abuse  of  Process  Challenges’,  Prosecutor  v.  Bemba 
Gombo, Situation in the CAR, ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 3, A. Ch., ICC, 19 October 2010, paras 
105–109. 
54  The definition is not concerned with a general unwillingness to conduct proceedings 
because in most instances in which a state is unwilling to carry out proceedings, there will be 
no proceedings and the question of genuineness will not arise.  Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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only causes of inability to conduct genuine proceedings, an assessment of ability genuinely to 
conduct proceedings would hardly ever be necessary; in those scenarios there usually are no 
cases.  However, the third cause of such inability, namely the unavailability of a national 
judicial system, expands the scope of the provision considerably and reveals the decisiveness 
of  the  factor  of  genuineness.  In  addition  to  practical  circumstances  (a  lack  of  judicial 
personnel,  an  insecure  environment  or  a  lack  of  essential  cooperation  by  other  states), 
normative factors such as the applicability of amnesty or immunity laws, the lack of the 
necessary extradition treaties and the absence of jurisdiction under domestic law, can render a 
system  ‘unavailable’  genuinely  to  conduct  proceedings.  Consequently,  states  with  fully 
functioning criminal justice systems can be found ‘unable’, provided that, in the particular 
case, the system is unavailable genuinely to conduct proceedings. 
 
c. Ne bis in idem 
When domestic proceedings have resulted in a trial, the grounds for admissibility of that case 
before the ICC are narrower. Article 17(1)(c) must be read in conjunction with paragraph 3 of 
Article 20 (‘Ne bis in idem’),
55 which states: 
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall 
be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: 
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due 
process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, 
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
The genuineness requirement is implicit in the two exceptions to the prohibition of ne bis in 
idem.  These  exceptions  are  nearly  identical  to  two  of  the  circumstances  that  evince 
unwillingness genuinely to prosecute as defined in Article 17(2).
56  
                                                 
55 See also  Lubanga Arrest Warrant, supra note 47, para. 29. Cf. contra Judgment on the 
Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  pursuant  to  Article  19(2)(a)  of  the  Statute  of  3  October  2006, 
Prosecutor  v.  Lubanga,  Situation  in  the  DRC,  ICC-01/04-01/06-772,  A.  Ch.,  ICC,  14 
December 2006, para. 23.  
56 Namely where the proceedings were for the purpose of ‘shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility’ or where the proceedings demonstrated ‘a lack of independence 
and impartiality inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’. Article 
20(3)(a) and (b) ICC Statute. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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Once a domestic trial has been concluded, the inability-to-conduct-the-proceedings-
genuinely criterion no longer provides an exception to inadmissibility of a case before the 
ICC.
57 For example, a case would not be deemed admissible before the ICC solely because it 
resulted  in  an  acquittal,  an  insignificant  punishment  or  an  immediate  pardon.  The 
circumstances in which the ICC can  proceed with a case that has been tried at the domestic 
level are thus stricter than those of the ICTY and ICTR , namely only if in the domestic trial 
there was an absence of an intent to bring the concerned person to justice, which can be 
evinced by shielding
58 or a lack of independence and impartiality.
59 
d. ‘Deferring’ cases to national jurisdictions 
The ICC has two procedures for ‘deferring’ cases to national jurisdictions. First, pursuant to 
Article 18 the Prosecutor shall defer (in the sense of ‘yield’) to the investigations of a state 
that informs the Court, within one month after the Prosecutor’s notification of his
60 intention 
to open an investigation, that it is investigating or has investigated persons related to the 
Prosecutor’s  announced  investigation.
61  If  he  defers,  the  Prosecutor  may  acquire  periodic 
information, preserve evidence, review such a decision and request the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
end the deferral.
62 Secondly, Article 19(11) grants the Prosecutor a discretionary power to 
‘defer’ (in the sense of ‘postpone’) his investigation.
63 If he does so, he may only ask for 
information, which he can later use to reconsider his decision.
64  
 
                                                 
57 This reveals the states parties’ intention for the Court not to act as an appellate court. The 
current arrangement, however, makes it attractive to states to wait to challenge admissibility 
until a domestic trial has ended. 
58 Article 20(3)(a) ICC Statute. 
59 Article 20(3)(b) ICC Statute. 
60 In the light of the gender of the current Prosecutor, this chapter  refers to the Prosecutor as 
‘he’. 
61 Article 18(2) ICC Statute and Rule 53 ICC RPE. 
62 Article 18(3), (5) and (6) ICC Statute and Rules 56–57 ICC RPE. 
63 The different meaning of ‘defer’ in Articles 18(2) and 19(11) is confirmed by the French 
text  of  the  Articles  18(2)  (‘le  Procureur  lui  d￩f￨re’)  and  19(11)  (‘le  Procureur  sursoit  à 
enqu￪ter’). 
64 Pursuant to Article 53(4) of the ICC Statute the Prosecutor may reconsider a decision not to 
investigate (or prosecute) ‘at any time … based on new facts or information’, without needing 
to seek the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization. The Statute does not provide for an expiry date 
for  the  right  to  reconsider,  but,  since  future  crimes  cannot  be  referred,  there  must  be  a 
connection between the facts the Prosecutor wishes to investigate (or prosecute) and the time-
period when the referral was made. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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iv. Other Non-exclusively Domestic Courts and Tribunals of Relevance 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor (SPSC) and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have international elements but are part of the domestic 
legal  order  of  respectively  East  Timor  and  Cambodia.  For  the  purpose  of  jurisdictional 
arrangements they should therefore be treated as domestic courts and the law governing them 
can determine their relationship only vis-à-vis other domestic courts. The SPSC were granted 
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to other courts in East Timor;
65 the law on the ECCC does 
not say so explicitly,
66 but in its practice no competing claims have arisen (yet).  
C. CONCLUSION: HYPOTHESES ON THE POTENTIAL OF JURISDICTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
TO SERVE AS A CONDUIT FOR CHANNELLING RULES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE TO NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 
On  the  basis  of  the  previous  section’s  analysis  of  the  jurisdictional  arrangements  a  few 
hypotheses can be developed on the various arrangements’ potential strengths and weaknesses 
as a conduit of influence on national jurisdictions.
67  
First, the potential influence of international criminal procedure on domestic criminal 
procedure is enhanced by the fact that none of the international tribunals has exclusive 
jurisdiction. If international tribunals were to have exclusive jurisdiction, d omestic courts 
would not be able to try the same international crimes, rendering international criminal 
procedure close to irrelevant at the domestic level.  
Secondly, the potential to influence is particularly strong for those arrangements where 
the  international  tribunal’s  competence  to  request  a  deferral  from  a  national  jurisdiction, 
exercise its jurisdiction or refer a case to the national jurisdiction depends on the actions of 
the domestic justice system. The IMT and IMTFE had no such conditionality, leaving little 
reason  for  domestic  courts  to  follow  the  international  tribunals’  procedure,  apart  from 
following a potential model. But the jurisdictional arrangements of the other international 
                                                 
65 UNTAET/REG/2000/15, 6 June 2000, para. 1.1.  
66 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) (Unofficial translation by the Council 
of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Task Force. Revised 26 August 2007).  Nor does the 
agreement between the UN and Cambodia concerning the ECCC speak t o jurisdictional 
arrangements. 
67 For more elaborate, and different, hypotheses on jurisdictional arrangements as a conduit of 
influence  on  domestic  processes,  see  W.W.  Burke-White,  ‘The  Domestic  Influence  of 
International  Criminal  Tribunals:  The  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former 
Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of  Bosnia  & Herzegovina’, (2008) 46(2) 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 279. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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tribunals  have  various  conditionalities  through  which  they  can  influence  domestic 
proceedings.  
The ICTY’s, ICTR’s and SCSL’s primacy is not unconditional: only if certain criteria 
are met can they oblige a state to defer a case to their jurisdiction. The fact that primacy can 
be invoked on the grounds that the domestic proceedings classify the conduct as ordinary
68 (as 
opposed to international) crimes or lack impartiality, independence or diligence, provides an 
incentive for states that wish to maintain jurisdiction to ensure that they have international 
crimes on their books and that their procedures are impartial, independent and diligent.  The 
third ground for the invocation of primacy, h owever, relates to the interest of the tribunal 
rather than the quality of domestic proceedings. This ground thus decreases the incentive for 
states to meet  any  criteria  because even if domestic proceedings   were to  meet all these 
criteria, the international tribunal could still invoke primacy because of its own interests.  
A potentially stronger conduit for t he ICTY, ICTR and SCSL to influence domestic 
criminal procedural law is the conditionality for referring a case to national jurisdictions. To 
have a case referred to it, the national justice system must meet several criteria, including of 
international criminal procedural law (a fair trial and no death penalty). The tribunals can 
monitor the domestic proceedings, and if they deem those proceedings to be insufficient, the 
tribunal can reclaim the referred case.  
With comparatively more complementary jurisdiction, the ICC can strongly influence 
domestic justice systems. Since a close relation between the case and other cases pursued by 
the ICC is not a ground for jurisdiction of the ICC, in contrast to the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, 
the admissibility of cases before the ICC entirely depends on the (non)actions of domestic 
justice systems. States  that wish  to  avoid  ICC interference in  a  case can succeed if they 
initiate genuine domestic proceedings in the same case. At the same time, the ICC’s more 
complementary jurisdiction limits  the conditions  by  which the Court  can  assess domestic 
justice systems. The ICC can claim jurisdiction only if there are no domestic proceedings or if 
there are domestic proceedings but those proceedings lack genuineness. The ICC can thus not 
require  anything  more  of  domestic  proceedings  than  that  they  are  genuine,  as  narrowly 
defined in the Rome Statute in the descriptions of unwillingness and inability.  
Similarly, the ICC can exert less influence through conditionality on grounds of ne bis 
in idem than the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL. First, whereas the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR 
and SCSL allow those tribunals to retry a case that has been tried in a domestic court if the 
                                                 
68 See sources cited in supra notes 1 and 36 and corresponding text. Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
others, Oxford University Press 
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conduct was tried domestically as an ordinary crime, a case would not be rendered admissible 
before the ICC solely because it was qualified in domestic proceedings as an ordinary crime.
69 
Secondly, whereas the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL may claim jurisdiction on the ground that 
the domestic proceedings lack(ed) impartiality or independence, irrespective of whether this is 
to the benefit or detriment of the accused,
70 a violation of the accused’s right to a fair trial at 
the domestic trial does not provide an independent ground on which the ICC may find a case 
admissible. A lack of independence or impartiality will be inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the accused to justice only if it has worked to his or her benefit. 
In  comparison  with  the  ICTY,  ICTR  and  SCSL,  the  ICC  also  has  fewer  options 
conditionally to ‘defer’ cases to domestic jurisdictions. First, the ICC has no procedure for 
deferring  already  initiated  cases  (as  opposed  to  investigations  into  a  general  situation)  to 
national jurisdictions. Once a case has been opened it is either admissible or inadmissible 
before the ICC; the Court cannot determine that the case is inadmissible on the condition that 
subsequent domestic proceedings fulfil certain criteria.  
Secondly, when reviewing domestic investigations for the purpose of Articles 18 and 
19(11) the ICC may not set the same conditions as the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL for considering 
or ending a deferral: prosecution as international crimes instead of ordinary crimes, domestic 
fair trial standards and the application of the death penalty are no grounds for admissibility of 
a case before the ICC and thus the ICC cannot set these as conditions for a deferral. 
Whether  in  practice  this  potential  is  realized  depends  on  the  validity  of  the 
assumptions underlying the hypotheses and on intervening variables. One assumption that 
may not always apply, as evidenced by the phenomenon of so-called ‘self-referrals’ in the 
context of the ICC,
71 is that states prefer exercising jurisdiction domestically to international 
                                                 
69 Article 20(3) of the ICC Statute refers expressly to  ‘conduct’ rather than to ‘crime’ in 
defining the two situations when the ICC is not prohibited from trying someone who has 
already been tried by another court for conduct that is also proscribed in the ICC’s Statute. 
The use of ‘conduct’ rather than ‘crimes’ indicates that the characterization of the impugned 
behaviour in the domestic proceedings is entitled to deference from the ICC. The use of 
‘conduct’ in Article 20(3) contrasts sharply with the use of ‘crime’ in Article 20(2), which 
lays down criteria regarding when a domestic court wishes to try a case after the ICC has. See 
also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, IT-01-47-T, T. Ch., ICTY, 15 
March 2006, para. 257 (concluding that ‘the Statute of the International Criminal Court leaves 
the characterisation of the crimes open to national courts’). 
70 Article 10(2)(b) ICTY Statute and Rule 9(ii) ICTY RPE; Article 9(2)(b) ICTR Statute; 
Article 9(2)(b) SCSL Statute; Article 5(2) STL Statute.  
71 For a more elaborate discussion of this assumption, see S.  Nouwen and W. Werner, ‘The 
Law  and  Politics  of  Self-Referrals’,  in  A.  Smeulers  (ed.),  Collective  Violence  and Draft forthcoming chapter in International Criminal Procedure, edited by Göran Sluiter and 
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involvement. Intervening variables may also influence the conduit function of jurisdictional 
arrangements.  One  of  them  is  mediation  of  jurisdictional  arrangements  by  norm 
entrepreneurs: advisors and activists who interpret and explain jurisdictional arrangements by 
taking into account factors other than the legal texts. Consequently, as anecdotal evidence 
confirms, the invocation and understanding of jurisdictional arrangements in practice deserve 
another chapter.
72 
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255. 
72  See, e.g., F.  M￩gret,  ‘Too  Much  of  a  Good  Thing?  Implementation  and  the  Uses  of 
Complementarity’, in C. Stahn and M.E. Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011,  forthcoming)  and  S.M.H.  Nouwen,  Complementarity  in  the  Line  of  Fire:  The 
Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, Cambridge University Press, 2012, forthcoming). 